My last job was that of a Strategy Analyst in a business unit during 2005-06. It didn’t take long to realize that my primary responsibility was to create a data-backed case justifying senior management decisions, a kind of reverse engineering. The leaders were privy to a much bigger context, travelled extensively meeting CXOs in client and partner organizations mostly abroad, and were aware of investor expectations. In contrast, I was an armchair analyst synthesizing traffic from the meetings and the Internet. I didn’t know at the time that the “damn analyst”, as Henry Kissinger’s called him, in an intelligence department does pretty much the same, even if the decision involves going to war in Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein. What should a strategy analyst be careful about? In this article, I would like to summarize the 3 tips Martha Kessler gives in a panel on “1973 Arab-Israeli War: An intelligence analyst perspective” in 2013 (Martha's speech starts at 30:50)
Martha Kessler was in her mid-twenties when she was deputed as an analyst to the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) in Libya and then moved in the Arab-Israeli Office branch after Libya merged with Egypt for a short time months before Arab-Israel Yom-Kippur war in 1973. In the panel, she describes 3 things she learned from her career in the CIA spanning four decades from 1970 to 2010.
For weeks leading up to the war that started on October 6, 1973, Martha was reading both the Libyan and Egyptian traffic. The Libya-Egypt country merger was a distraction for analysts as policy-makers were very much interested in it. Soviet Union had withdrawn its support for Egypt the year before (1972). A seven-page report came in from Cairo on its implications. It was a well-written, seemingly well-reasoned argument as to why Egypt was not going to go to war. It would have been extremely difficult for a Washington-based analyst to go against an opinion from the Chief of Station on the ground. When the war started, Martha got a call in the middle of the night. She and other US citizens were evacuated through Libya. The war was quite a shock to her, and its impact made Martha rethink her career because she realized a mistake of this sort could have huge consequences. What was she missing?
Context creates a filter: Years later, when Martha was deputed again as an Egyptian analyst, she reflected on her experience. She realized that she and many others were missing the context. The first aspect was that the legitimacy of the Sadat regime was disintegrating by the day. He was living with the legacy of the 1967 disaster. And he was running out of time. The Egyptian economy was under stress. They also had the burden of the Yemen war. The Egyptian population had been asked to sacrifice for a very long time. There was exhaustion in the military. There was humiliation in the eyes of the Arab world, and among Egypt’s supporters in Europe and the Non-Aligned world. The attitude of Israelis was extremely arrogant; they haunted the Egyptians. US and Soviets were negotiating cooperation agreements, and Sadat was the loser. Sadat had to do a begging bowl operation to survive militarily. Martha says, “If there had been this construct of context through which intelligence information had been filtered, we would have had a much stronger case in our own minds about whether Sadat was going to go to war or not.” Perhaps a similar contextual filter was at play – that Hamas won’t attack Israel – fifty years later.
Deception as distraction: There was a hostage crisis created by As-Sa’iqa, a Palestinian organization created and controlled by Syria. On September 28, 1973, members of As-Sa’iqa took Jewish emigrants from the Soviet Union hostage while they were traveling through Austria. Similarly, on October 4, Egypt announced demobilization of some reservists. There were a number of military exercises near the border. This was part of a broader deception effort. Martha says, “Deception, and this was very very good deception, is very hard to uncover.” Perhaps awareness of the fact that there could be deception is a good first step.
Role of biases and competing hypotheses: Martha highlighted tools like assumption checks and analysis of competing hypotheses. She says, “Think what it would have meant to be able to uncover our feelings that Israelis always win wars, Arabs always lose them. And we had a clearer idea of our biases and assumptions.” Another tool she highlighted was “analysis of competing hypotheses”. Keeping competing hypotheses alive and seeing how incoming information strengthens or weakens them. To me, it looks like a Bayesian belief update mechanism.
In my case, after six months into the job, tracking various assumptions behind the business plan and validating them with the internal and external data, I concluded that the business was not going anywhere. Of course, nobody believed me. It was one of the triggers for me to leave. It took a couple of years before the decline started reflecting in the annual reports, and the business unit was eventually disbanded.
On March 26, 2003, six days after Bush announced the invasion of Iraq, Martha Kessler gave a public speech at the University of Delaware titled “Intrigue of the Mideast Bazaar”. She said, “There may not even be an Iraq after the war because there is a real danger that the region could descend into chaos. Reconstruction may take considerably longer.” When asked how long it would take to establish democracy in Iraq, she said, “Perhaps never.” Damned analysts sometimes see things clearly.









